No, if you say that this is the halakha with regard to an unpaid bailee, who pays a double payment, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to a paid bailee, who does not pay a double payment?

Abaye states his objection: And if it enters your mind to say that an armed bandit is considered like a thief, it turns out that there is a case where a paid bailee pays a double payment, and it is when he states the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit.

Rav Yosef said to him: This is what the baraita is saying: No, if you say that this is the halakha with regard to an unpaid bailee, who pays a double payment for any claim that he makes concerning the theft of the item if he is subsequently found to be lying, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to a paid bailee, who pays a double payment for a false claim only when he states the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit.

Abaye raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Yosef from that which is taught in another baraita: The Torah states with regard to a case where one borrows an object or an animal from another: ''And it breaks or dies, he shall pay restitution [shalem yeshalem]'' (Exodus 22:13). I have derived only that the borrower is liable in a case where the object or animal breaks or dies; but from where do I derive that he is also liable if it was stolen or lost? You can state the following a fortiori inference: And just as a paid bailee, whom the Torah rendered exempt in a case where the item breaks or dies, is nevertheless liable for a case of theft or loss, then with regard to a borrower, who is liable even if the item breaks or dies, is not it logical that he is liable for theft or loss? And this is an a fortiori inference that has no refutation.

And if it enters your mind to say that an armed bandit is considered like a thief, why is this an argument that has no refutation? It can be refuted as follows: What is notable about a paid bailee? He is notable in that he pays double payment if he states the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, whereas a borrower does not pay double in such a case, but only the principal amount.

Rav Yosef said to him: This tanna holds that the requirement of a borrower to pay the principal without having the option to exempt himself by taking an oath is stricter than the requirement of a paid bailee to pay the double payment when claiming that it was stolen by an armed bandit, as this obligation is in effect only where he took an oath. Therefore, this doubled payment pertaining to a paid bailee cannot be used as a refutation of the a fortiori inference.

The Gemara asks: Let us say that the following baraita supports Rav Yosef’s opinion: In the case of one who rents a cow from another and it is stolen, and this renter says: I will pay for it and I am not taking an oath that the cow was stolen, since I do not wish to take an oath, and afterward the thief is found, the thief pays the double payment to the renter and not to the owner.

The Gemara notes: The Sages who sought to use that baraita to support Rav Yosef’s opinion assumed that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A renter is like a paid bailee and is liable for theft or loss, but from the fact that it teaches: And he said: I will pay for it and I am not taking an oath that the cow was stolen, one can learn by inference that if the renter wants, he can exempt himself from payment by taking an oath.

The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? Is it not a case where the renter states a claim that the item was taken by an armed bandit, in which case, as a paid bailee, he does not bear liability? And despite this, the baraita teaches: And if afterward the thief was found, the thief pays the double payment to the renter. Conclude from it that an armed bandit is considered like a thief.

The Gemara says in rejection of this proof: Do you maintain that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a renter is considered like a paid bailee? Perhaps this tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a renter is considered like an unpaid bailee, and on account of that he is absolved of responsibility even if he claimed it was a regular theft.

Alternatively, if you wish, say that the baraita is referring to an unarmed bandit and is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba bar Avuh, who reversed the opinions and teaches as follows: How does a renter pay? Rabbi Meir says he has the same liability as a paid bailee, whereas Rabbi Yehuda says he has the same liability as an unpaid bailee. Therefore, even if this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, it does not provide support for Rav Yosef’s opinion.

Rabbi Zeira said: Even without reversing the opinions, it is possible to explain that the baraita does not provide support for Rav Yosef’s opinion by saying as follows: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the renter states the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, and so he could have absolved himself by taking an oath, but afterward it is found that it was stolen by an unarmed bandit. On account of this, the bandit pays the double payment to the renter. No conclusive proof is brought as to whether one who found a lost item has the status of a paid or unpaid bailee.

§ The mishna teaches: If the animal fell into a garden and derives benefit, the owner pays for the benefit that it derives. Rav says: This is referring to a case where the vegetables softened the impact of striking the ground, and the owner pays for this benefit of the animal being saved from injury.

The Gemara comments: This statement of Rav indicates that the owner pays only for what occurred while the animal landed, but if the animal then ate from the garden, the owner is not required to pay even for the benefit that the animal derives. Shall we say that Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning? As Rav says that in a case where one placed his produce in the courtyard of another without permission, and an animal belonging to the owner of the courtyard ate the produce and was sickened thereby, the owner of the produce is not liable, as he can claim: The animal should not have eaten it. Similarly, here the owner of the animal can say: This animal fell through no fault of mine, and so it is not my fault that it ate.

The Sages of the Gemara say: How can these cases be compared? One could say that Rav said there that the animal should not have eaten the produce. This claim is relevant where the animal itself was injured by eating another’s produce, because the owner of the produce can say: I will not pay, because the animal should not have eaten. This is a claim to exempt the owner of the produce from paying the owner of the animal. Did Rav say that when the animal causes damage to another’s produce, the owner can exempt himself from paying the owner of the produce by stating this claim?

Rather,